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Introduction
This paper reports an experimental investigation of the effects of three forms of problem representation on compliance with the Sure-Thing and Substitution Principles. In addition, the effects of training subjects to transform a written problem statement into a visual representation are described.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) expected utility theory provides a normative model for decision making under risk. A number of axiom sets have been proposed as alternative bases of expected utility. The Sure-Thing Principle serves as an axiom in Savage (1954) and the Substitution Principle is an axiom in Marschak (1950).
Experimental studies of conformance with expected utility theory have relied heavily on investigations of conformance with these two principles. Subjects have customarily been presented with choice problems formatted only in written problem statements. In this paper, two visual problem representations are compared with written problem statements. Investigations of alternative problem representations, such as the study reported here, should contribute to the development of a theory of the way people frame decision problems. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) contains an insightful discussion of how the framing of decisions can influence choice.
First, the Sure-Thing and Substitution Principles are briefly described in this section. Next, the three forms of problem representation (written statements, proportional matrices, and balls in tubes) are presented in ?2. ?3 contains a description of the investigation of the effects of problem representation. The investigation of the effects of training subjects to construct proportional matrices is reported in ?4. ?5 contains a summary and discussion. The most common choice in the original problem is B (as indicated by the asterisk), guaranteeing the receipt of 100 million francs. Notice that there is an 89% chance that the outcome will be 100 million francs no matter whether alternative A or B is chosen. The transformed problem is constructed by changing this "sure-thing" payoff amount from 100 million to 0 francs. The Sure-Thing Principle states that this transformation should not alter the order of preference. Thus, if a person prefers B in the original problem, B' should be preferred in the transformed problem. However, most people prefer A', perhaps because they prefer the chance of the very high payoff of 500 million francs to a just slightly better chance of a 100 million franc payoff.
MacCrimmon ( 
Forms of Problem Representation
Three forms of problem representation were examined in this study. The first was a written problem statement such as: I: 100% chance of $3000 versus J: 75% chance of $3000 5% chance of $0 20% chance of $4000
The second form was a picture of balls in tubes. Here problems were represented as a choice between two tubes, each containing 100 labeled marbles as in Figure lA . Notice that each tube is portrayed as partly sunk into the ground, with the belowground portion representing the "sure-thing" payoff of $3000.
The third form was a proportional decision matrix where the width of a column is proportional to the probability of the corresponding event as illustrated in Figure lB .
Tubes and proportional matrices share some important features. In both representations, alternatives were visually partitioned so that identical "sure-thing" outcomes were lined up opposite each other and not colored. This might induce a cancellation operation (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 ing the constant probability ratio in the original and transformed problems. Indeed, this aspect is highlighted by the noncoloring of the identical outcomes, and coloring of all other outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The higher-payoff alternative, HP, is the one with a chance of getting a Porsche; the lower-payoff alternative, LP, has a 1 -p chance of a "lower-payoff" new convertible Volkswagen. Each problem can be characterized by specifying the probability p of receiving the common outcome C. The sample problem is labeled 0/0.20 since the "sure-thing" payoff C is "nothing" and the probability of this outcome is 0.20. In the nine choice problems, the "sure-thing" payoff C was either nothing, a 1965 regular Volkswagen, or a new convertible VW. The complete set of problems is shown in Table 1 . Undergraduate students enrolled in different sections, of lower division UCLA problem solving classes served as subjects. Subjects were not paid, though extra credit was earned in some classes. The nine problems were presented with other choice problems in a questionnaire administered during class sessions. The subjects were divided into three groups, by class sections (thus due to differing enrollments, group sizes varied). One group of 30 subjects received written problem statements. A group of 43 subjects received problems formatted in the tubes representation. Another group of 42 subjects received proportional matrix representations. When the visual (tube or matrix) forms of problem representation were used, the questionnaire also contained a written version of each choice problem. The complete questionnaires are contained in Keller (1983) .
Effects of Problem
Each subject received the same written instructions. Subjects were instructed to work entirely on their own. They were told to indicate a preference for each problem; in the unlikely event that they were indifferent between alternatives, they could choose both options. The instructions included an operational interpretation of probability, namely drawing a ball at random from a hat full of 100 colored balls. Finally, subjects were instructed to consider each problem separately, and not to assume their assets were augmented upon completion of each choice problem. Subjects also received detailed written explanations of a sample problem formatted in the representation used in their questionnaire. Table 2 summarizes the choices on the nine problems by the three groups. For example, 80.0% of the subjects who received only written problem statements chose the higher-payoff option in problem 0/0.96 as listed in the first row of the table. (Each subject's choices are in Keller 1983.) Over all nine problems, the mean percentage of choices of the higher-payoff option was 57.4% for those receiving only written problem statements. In contrast, those receiving the tubes representation had a mean of 63.3% and those receiving proportional matrices had a mean of 67.5%. There is a significant difference in the mean percentage of higher-payoff choices among these three groups (X2 = 6.85, 2 d.f., a < 0.05). Thus the alternative forms of problem representation led to different patterns of choices. These differences are discussed in relation to utility principle violations in the next paragraph and in the ensuing analysis.
Results
The first six rows in Table 2 correspond to problems in which the probability of a Porsche is equal to 0.75 times the probability of a new convertible Volkswagen, while the last three rows correspond to problems with the probability of a Porsche equal to 0.97 times the probability of a new VW. The first six problems differ only by the common outcome C and the probability of the common outcome. Conformance with the Sure-Thing Principle requires the same choice (always choose the higher-payoff option, always choose the lower-payoff option, or always be indifferent) on all problems varying only by the common outcome C. Likewise, conformance with the Substitution Principle requires the same choice on all problems varying only by the probability of the common outcome. Thus, conformance with both principles requires the same choice on the first six problems. Combining each subject's pattern of choices on the six problems, we can look at the aggregate results for indications of differences between the three groups. If every subject were to make the same choice on each of the first six problems in conformity with the utility principles, then the percentage choosing the HP option should be the same for each problem. Thus, for example, among those receiving written problem statements, every entry in the first column would be the same percentage X%, the mean would be X%, and the standard deviation would be 0. However, the percentage of the written statement group choosing the HP option actually varied from 80.0% to 13.3% with a standard deviation of An in-depth examination of the results shown in Table 3 provides greater insight. Within each set of three tests, the test listed in the middle row has the maximum violation, as was expected. In all cases, the maximum violation percentage occurred when there was the widest disparity between the values of the "sure-thing" payoff parameters (note that there were two cases in which there was a tie for the maximum). This pattern occurred for all three problem representation groups, but was most pronounced for those receiving written statements.
Next, the results for the group receiving written problem statements will be examined. Note that there were substantially fewer violations of the Sure-Thing Principle on the two tests in which C was "nothing" and C' was RVW, "a 1965 Regular VW," compared to the other tests. On one test, 0/0.66-RVW/0.66, 10% of the pairs of subjects believing that the difference between receiving nothing and a 1965 regular VW was relatively small in terms of strength-of-preference among various outcomes. Since the original and the transformed problems in a Sure-Thing Principle test differ only by the "sure-thing" payoff amounts, it is possible the pairs of problems in the two tests were perceived as being similar. For example, in the 0/0.96 "original" problem a subject might choose the higher-payoff option with a 0.03 chance of receiving a Porsche and a 0.97 chance of nothing. In conformance with the principle, the subject might also choose the higher-payoff alternative in the RVW/0.96 "transformed" problem, choosing a 0.03 chance of a Porsche, a 0.01 chance of nothing, and a 0.96 chance of a 1965 regular VW. In the Sure-Thing Principle tests which resulted in higher degrees of violation, one "sure-thing" payoff was a brand-new convertible VW and the other was either a 1965 VW or nothing. It is possible that many subjects believed there was a substantial difference between a new VW and nothing; and that this difference was larger than, but fairly close to, the difference between a new VW and a 1965 VW.
It is important to note that in the two tests in which C was "nothing" and C' was a "1965 Regular VW," written problem statements led to less violation than did matrices or tubes, though violations never exceeded 21%. It appears that subjects' choice processes applied to written problem statements may encourage conformity when the original and transformed problems are perceived to be similar. In the other four tests, when the "sure-thing" payoffs were wider apart, the written statement group exhibited substantially more Sure-Thing and Substitution Principle violations than the matrix or tube groups. In this case, it is possible the choice process induced by the matrix or tube representation differs from that used when presented with written statements. It can be seen from the table that those receiving written statements displayed much greater variability in the degree of principle violation than those with matrices or tubes, as measured by the standard deviations of the aggregate violation percentages.
Substitution Principle Effects
The effects of tube, proportional matrix, and written problem representations were evaluated on six Substitution Principle tests. The Substitution Principle is tested by pairs of problems varying only by the probability p of receiving the "sure-thing" outcome C. Table 4 contains a display of the Substitution Principle test results. Within each set of three tests, the test in the middle row has the greatest difference between p and p'. Based on the above reasoning, it was expected that the greatest violation would be observed in these tests; as seen in the table this pattern was observed, regardless of the form of problem representation. 
Effects of Training in Problem Structuring
An investigation of the effects of training in problem structuring is described in this section. This investigation was conducted in much the same way as that reported in ?3. A set of six choice problems was designed to provide tests of the Sure-Thing and Substitution Principles. The problems contained monetary payoffs. The general form of these problems is: The subjects were divided into two groups. One group of 32 subjects received a questionnaire with the above problems formulated in the proportional matrix representation. The other group of 15 subjects received training in matrix-structuring. During the training they were presented with written statements of the automobile-payoff problems and shown how to construct proportional matrices. Later, the trained subjects were given a written version of the questionnaire with the monetary-payoff problems and requested to construct a proportional matrix for each problem prior to making a choice. The complete questionnaires and detailed results are in Keller (1983) . Table 5 summarizes the choices on the six problems by the two groups. For example, 33.3% of the subjects who received matrix-structuring training chose the higher-payoff option in problem $0/0.75 as listed in the first row of the table. The mean percentage choosing the HP option among those receiving pre-structured proportional matrices was 43.8%, which is significantly different from the mean of 27.8% among those receiving matrix-structuring training (X2 = 6.59, 1 d.f., a < 0.025).
Results

Analysis
The effects of matrix-structuring training on the degree of violation of the SureThing and Substitution Principles were examined by comparing the violation percentages of the trained group with the untrained group. Aggregating the results of the three Sure-Thing and six Substitution Principle tests, the trained group exhibited 28.1% violations, which is significantly less than the 40.6% displayed by those receiving pre-structured matrices (Wilcoxon paired comparison test, a = 0.006). As can be seen in Table 6 , the trained group (second column) showed less violation in all tests except 0/0-$0/0. 10, when both p and p' are small. On the Sure-Thing Principle tests, there were only 13.3% violations with matrix-structuring training, versus a much higher 33.3% with pre-structured matrices. On the Substitution Principle Tests, there were 35.5% violations with matrix-structuring training, versus a higher 44.3% with prestructured matrices. Recall from ?3 that receipt of pre-structured proportional matrices was found to lead to fewer violations than receipt of the other problem representations on the Sure-Thing and Substitution Principle tests. Thus, on these principle tests, matrix-structuring training is likely to lead to even fewer violations than the already reduced number of violations resulting from using pre-structured proportional matrices.
In Table 6 
Summary and Discussion
This paper reports the first experimental attempt to examine the effects of alternative forms of problem representation on compliance with the Substitution Principle. It is the second attempt to examine the Sure-Thing Principle in a similar way. In addition to written statements, two forms of problem representations were considered here which have not been examined previously in this context. The proportional matrix representation was found to lead to fewer violations of both the Sure-Thing and Substitution Principles than the written or tubes representations. Subjects who were trained to restructure written problem statements into proportional matrices exhibited even fewer violations. The reduction in principle violations with proportional matrices might be due to subjects shifting their focus away from "sure-thing" payoff amounts and gaining a better understanding of the relative probabilities of outcomes. SureThing and Substitution Principle violations with different forms of problem representation were examined here on principle tests exhibiting high degrees of violation, like those in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , as well as on tests with less extreme parameters leading to relatively lower degrees of violation. Thus, the patterns of violation as displayed in Tables 3, 4 and 6 are the important results, rather than the violation percentages. As can be seen, the violation percentages vary greatly as the problem parameters are changed. On each principle test, the comparison of the different groups' performances in terms of the violation percentages is of most interest. The aggregate violation percentages across a number of tests allow comparison among groups. Note that if a set of tests with different parameters were used, the aggregate violation percentages would probably be different, but the same pattern of violations among the groups would be expected.
This line of research can be extended in a number of ways. First, in this study each subject received only one form of problem representation, so within subject comparisons were not possible. A study could also be done in which each subject used each form of problem representation (cf. Moskowitz 1974) . A further study might attempt to elicit the internal problem frame used by each subject. For example, an experiment could be set up to monitor the amount of attention a subject focuses on different facets of a problem. Another experiment might allow a subject to choose from a "menu" of problem frames on a cathode-ray tube graphic display. Thus the subject could "shop around" among the alternative forms of representation for a choice problem prior to making a choice. It may ultimately be possible to construct a decision-style profile for an individual which would specify utility-violating tendencies.
This work could also be extended by applying the approach to additional principles of utility theory (see Keller 1982 Keller , 1985 or other choice models. Other visual forms of problem representation and alternative training procedures could be evaluated. Finally, unpaid student subjects were presented with hypothetical choices in this study. Since this was the first study of its type, this experimental setting seemed prudent. Either real, consequential payoffs, or paid subjects might lead to less "random error" due to increased subject motivation, see Grether and Plott (1979) .'
